Up in smoke: Hopes of ADA protection for medical marijuana use are dashed . . . for now, anyway

As you all know, the Americans with Disabilities Act excludes "current users of illegal drugs" from protection. Meaning that an employer is free to take action against applicants or employees based on their current use of illegal drugs.

A question that has arisen a few times, and which I've managed to sidestep, has been this: What about current use of medical marijuana? Assuming the employee can certify that he or she is smoking pot with a doctor's approval and for a legitimate medical condition? In that event, can the employer take action against the employee for current use of drugs? Must the employer reasonably accommodate the drug use?

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As I said, I've been able to sidestep this question because, fortunately, the few times I've been asked, it's been from an employer in my state of North Carolina or another state that hasn't legalized medical marijuana. If the pot use isn't legal, then the employee who tests positive is a current user of an "illegal" drug, meaning it's ok to take adverse action based on the drug use.

(Laws, of course, vary from state to state, so be sure to check your jurisdiction. Some states, like New York, have human rights laws that provide more protections to employees than the ADA does.)

Back to whether medical marijuana use is protected under the ADA -- we now have some guidance from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.* The case is not an employment case -- rather, it arose from Title II of the ADA, which deals with state and local governments in the provision of public services. But the case provides some clues as to which way this relatively "employee-friendly" circuit would rule in an employment case arising from Title I of the ADA.

*The Ninth Circuit hears appeals from federal courts in Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington, and in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands.

In James v. City of Costa Mesa, the plaintiffs were severely disabled individuals who used marijuana to alleviate chronic pain. They sued after Costa Mesa and Lake Forest, both towns in Orange County, California, enacted ordinances and began taking action to close down medical marijuana dispensaries. The plaintiffs alleged that the anticipated closures would violate the ADA.Cannabis_Station.JPG

Here's the problem: although medical marijuana use is legal under California state law, it is illegal under the federal Controlled Substances Act. And the statute specifically says that "illegal" means any drug made illegal by the federal Controlled . . . well, you know. The parties agreed on that point.

But the ADA has an exception to the exclusion. The exception applies to "use of a drug taken under supervision of a licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by the Controlled Substances Act or other provisions of federal law." The plaintiffs argued that this language meant that even a drug prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act was ok if "taken under supervision of a licensed health care professional." The cities said, no, the exception means the drug use must BOTH be "under supervision" AND "be authorized by . . . federal law." Because marijuana use is not authorized by federal law, the cities said, it would not violate the ADA for them to close down the marijuana dispensaries.

Two out of three judges agreed with the cities. The plaintiffs say they plan to petition to have the case re-heard by all of the Ninth Circuit judges. This will be an interesting issue to follow, as more states adopt statutes and pressure on the federal government increases to legalize the use of medical marijuana. (Links to these websites are for informational purposes only and should not be interpreted as an endorsement of their political activity.)

In other ADA news, Eric Meyer of The Employer Handbook blog beat me to it on a case publicized this week. Since I can't top his summary, I will link to his "How to Lose a Disability Discrimination Case in 5 Easy Steps." If you have ever made a mistake in dealing with an ADA situation, this case will make you feel a lot better -- misery loves company!

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I hope you all have a great Memorial Day weekend, and to our armed forces serving our country at home and abroad, both living and deceased, THANK YOU.

 

Photo credits: Wikimedia Commons (public domain).

 

Religious employers, the ministerial exception and single moms -- again!

I wonder if there is a recognized legal specialty in the area of unwed-pregnant-moms-and-religious-schools-discrimination law. If so, I think I will qualify very soon. Happy belated Mother's Day?

Not long ago, I wrote about the Archdiocese of Cincinnati, which terminated an unmarried pregnant teacher at a Catholic school -- not for "immoral" behavior -- although they did think her behavior was "immoral" -- but not in the way you would think -- she became pregnant through artificial insemination, which Catholic doctrine teaches is a sin. The issue in the case was whether the Archdiocese qualified for the ministerial exception.

Ma_ma_wheres_my_pa.jpgThis week, Bloomberg BNA reported a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which hears appeals from courts in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, involving a Christian (presumably Protestant) school in Florida that terminated a teacher who became pregnant the old-fashioned way. The teacher was unmarried when she conceived, but she married the father within a month. By the time she disclosed her pregnancy to the school, she had been married for several months.

(Editorial comment: It seems pretty harsh to terminate her for "immorality" when she married the guy. But what do I know?)

Anyway, she sued for pregnancy discrimination, and the school moved for summary judgment based on two grounds:

1) The ministerial exception applied, meaning that the court should not interfere at all in the school's personnel decisions, and

2) The plaintiff was unable to show any similarly situated non-pregnant employees who were treated differently.

The trial court, which had ruled before the Supreme Court's decision in Hosanna-Tabor, found that the ministerial exception did not apply. Although we don't know what kind of teacher this plaintiff was, the school implicitly admitted on appeal that she was not a "minister."*

*If I may digress: The majority opinion in Hosanna-Tabor did not provide any extended discussion of what constitutes a "minister." If you recall, the teacher in that case was actually called a "minister," was ordained, and taught religion and led worship services, so her situation was clear-cut. (A concurring opinion by Justices Alito and Kagan provided an excellent discussion of who else might be a "minister," but their opinion is not binding.) The court in the Catholic school case from Ohio found that the ministerial exception did not apply, at least not in the early stages of the litigation, because the plaintiff was a technology/computer teacher with no religious function.

Back to our case: the trial court granted summary judgment to the school on the second ground (no evidence of pregnancy discrimination). The plaintiff appealed, and the 11th Circuit sent the case back for a jury trial.

The 11th Circuit decision is short. The ministerial exception was a non-issue, the Court said, because the school had not done enough to preserve that issue for appeal. (Don't ask!)

On the merits, the 11th Circuit found that the waters were muddy enough that a jury should decide whether the teacher was terminated for "immoral" behavior (which would be legal, because this was a religious school that taught that premarital sex was a sin) or whether she was terminated because the school did not want to have to deal with her maternity leave (which could be pregnancy discrimination and would have nothing to do with religious doctrine).

According to the teacher, when she announced her pregnancy to the administrator, he threw his head back and said, "We feared something like this would happen." A fairly ambiguous statement. Maybe he meant, "We knew you were spending too much time with that Romeo (whom you later married) and were going to become pregnant out of wedlock, which is a sin." In which case, the school might have had a defense.

Except for the fact that the comment was allegedly made before the administrator knew that the child was conceived out of wedlock.

And, according to the Court, this comment could also have meant, "Those darned women! Here we go again with another maternity leave! From now on, we hire no female teachers unless they can produce a doctor's note certifying that they've had their tubes tied or have been through the change!" If that's what the administrator meant, the school had committed pregnancy discrimination and was not acting out of a concern for the morality of the teacher's behavior.

Acording to the teacher, the administrator also told her she'd have to take the entire school year off because it would be too hard to find a substitute for a partial year, and he allegedly said that the time off and her "immorality" were both problems from the school's standpoint. 

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The Court also said that the administrator had testified that all would have been forgiven if the teacher had just acknowledged her sin and repented . . . but she never did. Again, this would tend to support a finding that the termination was for religious reasons. However, the teacher alleged she had acknowledged and repented. This creates what is known as (CAUTION: legalese alert) "a genuine issue of material fact," which means that the case cannot be dismissed on summary judgment and must be tried by a jury, who will decide who's telling the truth.

IF YOU'LL PARDON THE EXPRESSION . . . THE MORAL OF THE STORY

I could be wrong, but I don't think the courts like seeing pregnant teachers fired for being "immoral." To an outsider it looks like the religious employers are punishing only women -- and, even worse, only pregnant women -- because they're the ones who "get caught." Accordingly, even though the courts are required to apply the ministerial exception in appropriate situations, it's my impression that they look hard for reasons to find that it doesn't apply.

Accordingly, here are some suggestions for religious employers who want to follow their religious tenets without being sued all the time:

1) Seriously consider adopting a "ministerial" policy. Designate which positions you consider to be "ministerial" and which ones you do not. Minister, priest, rabbi, or imam are easy calls. In a school setting, designate school administrators, and all teachers who teach religion or lead prayer or worship services. You may want to include your choir director, or you may prefer just to have a darned good musician no matter how he or she carries on outside of work. Decide that in advance. Do not include positions like janitor, groundskeeper, IT guy (or gal), or gravedigger. Do not try to get around this by calling your janitor "Minister of Sanitation" or your IT guy (or gal) "Minister of Networks." The courts were not born yesterday. They will see right through that.

2) Have separate written codes of conduct for "ministerial" and "non-ministerial" positions. Yes, I am advocating a double standard. You should be used to double standards now that the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirements have been in place for, oh, I don't know, the past 20 years!!! Seriously, a written policy like this will make it much easier for you to assert the "ministerial exception" when you think it should apply.

And make sure your rules for ministerial employees are spelled out precisely. An ordained minister, or a priest, rabbi, or imam may know all the rules. Let us hope so, anyway. But a choir director may not. One of the problems for the employer in the Ohio pregnancy case was that there was no evidence that the teacher, a non-Catholic, even knew that artificial insemination was considered a sin. Write your rules with your non-ordained ministerial employees in mind so you are sure that everyone knows the expectations. Consider it a teaching opportunity!

3) Believe it or not, have the courage of your convictions. If your religious beliefs really teach that premarital sex is a sin, embrace that. Don't try to "soften" a "morals" termination by claiming, for example, that you were really just afraid that you wouldn't be able to cover for the employee's absence from work. If you terminate for a "strictly religious" reason, you are much likelier to be able to take advantage of the ministerial exception and be upheld. If you weasel because you're afraid people will think you're being "judgmental," the court will think you're just like everybody else and will hold you to the same standards that apply to everybody else.

4) That said, if you want to take action against "immoral" employees, don't just fire all the unmarried or "belatedly married" pregnant women. If you know that other employees (male or female) are cohabiting, having extramarital affairs, cheating on their income taxes, eating meat on Friday*Hester_Prynne.jpg, etc., etc., then take action against those employees, too. (Also, with your unmarried pregnant employees, never forget that it takes two to tango. She didn't get pregnant all by herself, ya know.)

*I tease here -- this is not a rule for Catholics any more except during Lent. Probably not much of a ground for termination based on "immorality," even if it were still the rule.

5) Make sure that you are generally welcoming and accommodating to pregnant and childbearing employees, not whining about absences due to morning sickness, or maternity leaves, or the like. This will help you prove that the "sin" was the reason for the termination rather than the "pregnancy."

 

Speaking of moms, I was honored to be a part of the May Employment Law Blog Carnival: Mother's Day Edition, hosted by plaintiff's employment attorney Donna Ballmer. Donna has a collection of excellent blog posts covering a cornucopia of topics (if you'll pardon my mix of holiday metaphors), including the EEOC's new guidance on criminal background checks, social media, and what to do if your employee flips you the bird (I kid you not!). Please be sure to check it out.

When can an employer fire an employee for medical leave fraud?

I was off enjoying the Florida sunshine last weekend while learning the latest techniques in pettifoggery and obfuscation (kidding!), but I hope I'll be making up for it today with a good case answering the musical question: "What does an employer do when it finds out that its employee on 'medical leave' is actually doing stuff?" You know, like working another job, or hanging out at the gun show, or raking leaves, or riding the Roundup at the amusement park . . . without even throwing up?

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This question has bedeviled more than one employer, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which hears appeals from federal district courts in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee, has given us a good answer. But first, let's talk a bit about the employer's dilemma.

You have a policy saying that an employee can't work while on medical leave. Your policy probably doesn't cover recreational activities, but everybody knows you don't go to Six Flags or play golf or till the soil forAcrobats,_Sydney,_1930s_Sam_Hood_(3381347056).jpg your vegetable garden when you're sick or injured.

So you have an employee who goes out on medical leave, and somebody tells you that they saw Joe doing one of these things. Maybe you even heard that Joe had another job.

Can you fire him for fraudulent medical leave?

Not necessarily. First, it's a good idea to make sure the rumor is true, or at least "more likely than not" to be true. But even if you were the one who saw Joe doing cartwheels in his front yard during his leave for degenerative disc disease, you may not have caught him as "red-handed" as you think. (Well, maybe if he was doing cartwheels . . .) It could be that the employee's "recreational" activity, or even alternate employment, is within his medical restrictions while your job is not. In fact, most doctors would recommend that employees engage in some activity while on medical leaves. It can speed recovery and help to ward off depression by providing sunshine, fresh air, exercise, and even a little bit of money to help pay those doctor bills that you, as the employer, are not already paying.

I've seen this situation a time or two. Several years ago a client's full-time employee had to take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act for stress. While he was on leave, somebody reliable saw him working in the men's department at a local shopping center. The company was ready to fire him for fraudulent FMLA leave, but I recommended caution because of the possibility that the job at the department store was within his medical restrictions while our client's job was not. The company investigated, and sure enough -- it turned out that the store job was part time, much less "stressful" than the employee's regular job, and completely within his restrictions.

So we ended up letting him continue to work at the store while on leave from the client.

On the other hand, we've caught (on video, which is always fun) a company nurse who supposedly couldn't work at all doing exactly the same work full time for a local doctor's office while out on workers' compensation leave from our client. We fired her and terminated her workers' comp. She threatened to sue, but gave up pretty quickly.

Other fishy real-life cases have included

*an employee out with a bad back who was seen at church wearing seven-inch stiletto heels and having no trouble getting around in them, even on the church's gravel parking lot.

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*an employee out for depression who spent an entire day manning a table at a gun show.

*an employee with a bad back who spent an entire day stocking and manning a booth at a fair, and then loading boxes into her van at the end of the day.

Our recommendation in all of these cases is to take a case-by-case approach, first making sure you have reliable information, and then considering the nature of the employee's illness or injury, the employee's restrictions, and the activity he or she was "caught" doing.

But how much investigation is enough? That's the question that's been answered by the Sixth Circuit

The plaintiff (we'll call him "Betelgeuse") absolutely, positively won't work, babe - he just won't - but then some co-workers saw him at an Oktoberfest, walking around and drinking bier andOktoberfest_woman.jpg flirting with frauleins. (I made the "flirting" part up, but the rest is true.) The employer did an investigation, interviewing the employees who had seen Betelgeuse at the fest. All but one said he seemed to be fine. One said that he seemed to be in pain. The employer also reviewed his medical and personnel records, and finally decided to fire him for taking fraudulent FMLA leave. Betelgeuse sued, alleging "interference" (not letting him have FMLA leave* he was entitled to) and retaliation (punishment for taking FMLA leave).

*Interference can also include discouraging an employee from taking FMLA leave.

The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, and two judges on a three-judge panel at the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although Betelgeuse claimed that the employer should have done a more thorough investigation, including talking to the witness who thought the employee seemed to be in pain and talking to BG's own physician, the majority said that an employer didn't have to be correct and didn't even have to conduct an "optimal" investigation. As long as it appeared that the employer honestly and reasonably believed that the employee had misrepresented his medical condition, it was ok for the employer to take action without being liable for FMLA violations.

It's obviously great news for employers that they (1) don't have to be right beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) don't have to do an airtight investigation as long as they've done some reasonable investigation.

And, now that you're feeling all warm and fuzzy, a disclaimer - notice I said that two out of three judges reached this decision. That leaves one, who dissented. According to the dissenting judge, the employer should have followed up with the witness and the employee's doctor and its failure to do so created a "genuine issue of material fact" (requiring a jury trial) as to whether the employer's belief was reasonable and in good faith. Given the dissent, it's possible that the plaintiff will ask to have the appeal reheard by all of the judges on the Sixth Circuit, and the full Sixth Circuit may reach a different decision.

And in other news . . .

Yesterday I was honored to be part of a web radio interview hosted by Stephanie R. Thomas of The Proactive Employer with Lilly Ledbetter (yes, that Lilly Ledbetter!) on the subject of equal pay. The interview is posted on Stephanie's website, and you can listen to it at your convenience. Next Thursday at 3 p.m. EDT, Stephanie will be interviewing Patricia Shiu of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs. Good stuff!

Also, I must send you to a great post by Jon Hyman talking about why we don't need new legislation to address pregnancy discrimination. Jon also provides a link to another excellent post by Suzanne Lucas ("the Evill HR Lady") on "Why you should stop attending diversity training." (Please note that Suzanne is not anti-diversity -- just "anti" most of the training that goes on these days. I happen to agree with her, but whether you do or not, I think you'll find her post thought provoking and worth your time.)

To all my fellow moms out there, have a wonderful Mother's Day weekend!

(Photos from Wikimedia Commons, public domain.)

On retreat -- back next Friday

I am off to confer, converse, and otherwise hob-nob with my brother attorneys at our firm retreat this weekend. I'll be back next Friday (May 11) -- I hope to see you then!

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